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Abstract
Animals can maximize benefits but it is not known if they adjust their investment according to expected pay-offs. We
investigated whether monkeys can use different investment strategies in an exchange task. We tested eight capuchin
monkeys (Cebus apella) and thirteen macaques (Macaca fascicularis, Macaca tonkeana) in an experiment where they could
adapt their investment to the food amounts proposed by two different experimenters. One, the doubling partner, returned
a reward that was twice the amount given by the subject, whereas the other, the fixed partner, always returned a constant
amount regardless of the amount given. To maximize pay-offs, subjects should invest a maximal amount with the first
partner and a minimal amount with the second. When tested with the fixed partner only, one third of monkeys learned to
remove a maximal amount of food for immediate consumption before investing a minimal one. With both partners, most
subjects failed to maximize pay-offs by using different decision rules with each partner’ quality. A single Tonkean macaque
succeeded in investing a maximal amount to one experimenter and a minimal amount to the other. The fact that only one
of over 21 subjects learned to maximize benefits in adapting investment according to experimenters’ quality indicates that
such a task is difficult for monkeys, albeit not impossible.
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Introduction
The foundations of decision research, and hence its contempo-
rary shape, have been strongly influenced by thinking from
disciplines like economics. Human investors adjust their decisions
according to partners on the basis of expected pay-offs. They are
supposed to make rational decisions and to revise their decisions in
order to optimize satisfaction [1]. Animals can also maximize pay-
offs. When individuals exploit an environment where resources are
distributed in patches, they can leave the patch and search for a
new one when the rate of pay-off falls below the average rate for
the entire area [2], [3]. Rational strategies are then defined as
those increasing fitness and are an outcome of natural selection
[4]. The theory of biological markets in particular assumes that
living beings can adjust their investment based on the offers
potentially provided by several partners [5]. In non-human
primates, individuals may vary their rates of grooming in exchange
to access for commodities [6], [7]. They are able to invest, that is,
to avoid immediately consuming some goods with the intent of
winning more [8], [9]. We lack evidence, however, about their
abilities to adjust quantitatively their investment to expected pay-
offs.
Monkeys and great apes appear to possess many of the skills
required to perform successful investments in various contexts.
They can make inferences, categorize objects and understand
tertiary relations [10]. They are also able to make ‘more’ and ‘less’
value judgments about discrete quantities [11]–[14]. Numerous
studies showed that monkeys are good at recognizing magnitudes
for values under 8. For instance, rhesus macaques reliably prefer
the larger amount in choices of one versus two items, two versus
three, and three versus four [15], [16]. Monkeys can also
discriminate between larger numerical values when high ratios
are involved [17]. Rhesus macaques can learn to select the
stimulus with the larger number of dots when pairs of numerical
values between 1 and 9 are presented [18], [19]. Similar results are
found in squirrel monkeys and tufted capuchin monkeys with
discrimination between discrete quantities of one to nine food
items [20]–[24].
Non-human primates are also able to combine discrete
quantities, which can allow them to adjust their investment
quantitatively. When presented with two trays, each tray
containing two separate sets of food items, chimpanzees and
capuchin monkeys select the greater total, indicating that they
consider the sum of items [25]–[27]. Both great apes and monkeys
succeed in tasks where they have to choose between two covered
sets of food items to which an experimenter visibly adds or
removes items in unequal numbers (capuchin monkeys: [28];
chimpanzees: [13], [29], [30]; orangutans: [12]; rhesus macaques:
[15]). Monkeys can differentiate between different contingencies in
discrimination learning task where they have to distinguish
between two cues to gain rewards [10]. They can also discriminate
between experimenters who behave in different ways towards
them. For instance, capuchins and macaques preferentially
indicate a food location to the most cooperative partners [31],
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Monkeys can thus use potential partners as a tool to gain more.
On the other hand, while monkeys may instrumentalize
conspecifics, they may limit this to anticipating their behavior
and not their intentions. It should be emphasized that in most
experiments they appear unable to recognize actions in term of
goals contrary to great apes [35]–[37] (but see [33]).
With regard to future-oriented behaviors, several experiments
show that apes and monkeys can accept to lose an immediate
benefit to gain more later; they postpone gratification from some
seconds to a few minutes in tasks where they are given a choice
between an immediately available but less preferred reward, and
a delayed but more preferred one [38]–[40]. They sustain similar
delays of gratification when presented with food items accumu-
lating at regular time intervals [41], [42]. Non-human primates
also maximize their pay-offs in tests requiring them to exchange
with an experimenter. Chimpanzees and capuchin monkeys can
learn to attribute values to non-edible tokens and exchange them
for food [43]–[45]. However, this set up implies training monkeys
to understand the value of the tokens. Monkeys and great apes
can also give food items to receive a qualitatively more desirable
one [8], [9], [46]. In that case, the value of the food is directly
measured by consumption. In a study where capuchin monkeys
were allowed to eat part of an item before returning it, individuals
were seen to nibble most of a food item before attempting to
exchange the remains for a larger reward with a human
experimenter [8], [47]. Also, non-human primates can wait
longer for a return if the expected quantity of food is larger [47],
[48].
Decision-making in primates relies on skills requiring them to
take into account several factors involving evaluation of discrete
quantities, physical or temporal cost, and partner’s reliability to
maximize their pay-offs. In this study, we tested tufted capuchin
monkeys, Tonkean macaques and long-tailed macaques in an
exchange task where each subject initially received four food
rewards that they could either consume or give back. To maximize
the pay-off, subjects had to adapt the amount of food items they
gave initially – the investment – to the food amounts to be
returned by two different experimenters. We investigated whether
the subjects could invest differentially depending on the experi-
menter’ qualities in term of income. One experimenter gave back
a reward twice the amount of the subjects’ initial investment
(doubling partner, providing 0, 2, 4, 6 or 8 rewards if subjects
returned respectively 0, 1, 2, 3 or 4 rewards), whereas the other
always gave back a constant amount regardless of the subjects’
initial investment (fixed partner, always providing 8 rewards
regardless of the amount initially returned). To maximize food
income, subjects had to respond in different ways to each
experimenter, offering a maximal amount to the first one and a
minimal amount to the second (Table 1).
Results
When giving less than four raisins to experimenters, subjects
exhibited different ways to remove raisins from the initial amount.
They either ate some and returned the remaining ones (Pis, Arn,
Lad, Pao), put all of them in their mouth and spat some back (Sha,
Rav, Lad, Syb, Sam), or shared the four raisins between both
hands keeping the content of one and returning the content of the
other (Kin, Sad, Syb). Each subject consistently used the same way
across the different phases of study (except for Lad and Syb who
alternated their removal procedures; they mainly used the second
procedure but sometimes used the first one for Lad, or the third
one for Syb).
Phase 1
In this phase, 20 subjects failed to adapt the amount of given
raisins according to partners’ quality during 21 sets of two sessions
(Figure 1 and S1). Among subjects, seventeen consistently gave all
four raisins to the doubling and fixed partners. Two other subjects
(Sam, Pao) gave 1–3 raisins to both partners. A third subject (Arn)
initially gave all four raisins, but after the 16
th set of two sessions,
he learned to give 1–2 raisins to both partners. Comparing the
performances of subjects according to partners’ quality in the last
10 sets of sessions did not yield significant differences (fixed
partner: mean number of raisins 6 sd =3.5560.49, doubling
partner: m=3.5660.36, n=20 subjects, T=53.0, p=0.642).
One subject was able to adjust his behavior according to
experimenters’ quality. This Tonkean macaque (Sha) was tested
during 24 sets of two sessions. From the 17
th set, he gave a
decreasing numbers of raisins (three to one) to the fixed partner
while consistently returning 3–4 raisins to the doubling partner
(Figure 2). Comparing his performances according to partners’
quality during the last 10 sets of sessions yielded a statistically
significant difference (fixed: m=2.5161.35, doubling:
m=3.6060.91, n=10 sets, T=4.0, p=0.016).
Phase 2
In Phase 2, the 20 subjects that had previously failed to
differentiate between partners’ quality were tested in sessions
involving a single fixed partner. Phase 2 was run to counterbalance
the tendency of most subjects to return all 4 raisins in Phase 1.
Among the 20 subjects, 13 maintained the main strategy used in
Phase 1 (see Figure S1). The other seven subjects altered their
behavior in the course of sessions. They learned to give 1–2 raisins
to the fixed partner (Figure 1).
Phase 3
The seven subjects who reduced the number of raisins they gave
in Phase 2 were tested again in sessions involving two different
experimenters (Figure 1). Among them, six continued to give 1–2
raisins to both partners as in Phase 2. Comparing the
performances of subjects according to partners’ quality did not
yield significant differences (fixed: m=1.0560.10, doubling:
m=1.1060.15, n=6 subjects, T=15.0, p=0.144). A seventh
subject (Rav) started to stop exchanging with the doubling partner,
consuming the four raisins. Yet, he kept on giving one raisin to the
fixed partner. The analysis showed that he responded differently to
Table 1. Number of rewards obtained from both
experimenters and subjects’ net income according to the
number of raisins returned by subjects.
Doubling partner Fixed partner
Returned number
of raisins Reward Net income Reward Net income
00 4 0 4
12 5 8 1 1
24 6 8 1 0
36 7 8 9
48 8 8 8
Within one session, the subjects’ net income, i.e. the amount of raisins non-
invested by the subject plus those received after return. The subject maximises
its gain by giving more (4 raisins, net income 8) to the doubling partner, and
less to the fixed one (1 raisin, net income 11).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0017801.t001
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m=0.1760.39, n=10 sets, T=55.0, p=0.005).
The subject Sha, having differentiated between partners’ quality
in Phase 1, was tested in phase 3 with two new experimenters in
order to confirm his response (Figure 2). His behavior progressed
during the sessions. At first, he gave about 1–2 raisins to the fixed
partner while generally giving 2–3 raisins to the doubling one.
After several sessions, he gave 2–3 raisins to the fixed partner and
four to the doubling. In the last sessions, he gave a minimal
number (one) to the fixed partner and a maximal number (four) to
the other partner. Analyzing his performances showed that he
adopted contrasting strategies according to partners’ quality (fixed:
m=1.2361.26, doubling: m=3.6360.72, n=10 sets, T=55.0,
p=0.005).
Net incomes in Phases 1 and 3
By experimental design the subjects’ net income should differ
according to experimenters’ quality. We checked that it was larger
with the fixed than with the doubling partner in the last 10 sets of
sessions in Phase 1 for Sha (fixed: m=9.4961.01, doubling:
m=7.6060.34, n=10 sets, T=55.0, p=0.005) and other subjects
(fixed: m=8.4260.77, doubling: m=7.6160.84, n=20 subjects,
T=41.0, p=0.001), and also in Phase 3 for Sha (fixed:
m=10.1760.87, doubling: m=7.6360.35, n=10 sets, T=55.0,
p=0.005), Rav (fixed: m=10.9860.13, doubling: m=4.1860.39,
n=10 sets, T=55.0, p=0.005) and other subjects (fixed:
m=10.9560.20, doubling: m=5.1060.27, n=6 subjects,
T=21.0, p=0.028).
In Phase 1, Sha received a total of 2414 raisins (1046 raisins
with the doubling partner; 1368 raisins with the fixed partner;
difference: 322 raisins). For other subjects, the total mean of raisins
was of 2187 (983 raisins with the doubling partner; 1204 raisins
with the fixed partner; mean difference: 221 raisins). In Phase 3,
Sha earned a total income of 2478 raisins (1059 raisins with the
doubling partner; 1419 raisins with the fixed partner; difference:
360 raisins). Rav had a total income of 2071 raisins (435 raisins
with the doubling partner; 1636 raisins with the fixed partner;
difference: 1201 raisins). For other subjects, the total mean of
Figure 1. Number of raisins returned by seven subjects in Phases 1, 2 and 3. In Phases 1 and 3, subjects were tested with both doubling
and fixed partners. In Phase 2, subjects were tested with the fixed partner only. Six subjects successfully modified their strategy in Phase 2 except for
Arn who already changed of behavior at the end of Phase 1. In Phase 3, Rav returned 1 raisin then stopped exchanging with the doubling partner.
Each plot represents the mean number of raisins returned in one session of six trials, along with standard errors.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0017801.g001
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raisins with the fixed partner; mean difference: 687 raisins).
Discussion
A single subject (Sha) could maximize pay-offs by following
different rules according to experimenters’ quality. Most capuchins
and macaques were not able to adapt the invested amount of food
items to the potential returns from each experimenter. In Phase 1,
most individuals consistently gave a maximal amount to both. Such
strategy maximized pay-off with the doubling partner, but was
inappropriate with the fixed one. Fewer subjects showed the reverse
response pattern, giving a minimal number of raisins by the end of
this phase. This strategy maximized pay-offs with the fixed partner,
but not withthe doubling. In Phase 2, subjects had to exchange only
with the fixed partner. One third of them succeeded in maximizing
pay-off and learned to give a minimal amount. Among these seven
subjects, only one (Rav) discriminated between partners’ quality in
Phase 3 but failed to understand the rule that would bring him
optimal benefits with the doubling partner. The others subjects
maintained the same strategy as in Phase 2 and did not adapt their
investment strategy according to partners’ quality.
It might be argued that the experimental set-up did not provide
time enough for subjects to adjust their behavior, but the fact that
Sha learned to modify his behavior after some trials weakens this
interpretation. An alternative explanation is that most subjects may
have been unable to differentiate between experimenters’ quality
according to the food amounts that they returned. However, this
explanation is also unlikely since it is known that monkeys are able
to discriminate two experimenters behaving differently [31]–[34].
Moreover, most subjects sometimes gave back a different number of
raisins to experimenters, thus getting an opportunity to learn that
experimenters did not respond in the same manner. It should be
emphasized that the net income differed according to experiment-
ers’ quality, since no subjects always gave 0 or 4 raisins. In Phase 1,
subjects experienced a difference of close to one raisin between
experimenters; and in Phase 3, the subjects’ net income with the
fixed partner was more than twice than with the doubling partner.
Still, they did not adjust their behavior according to the partner’
quality. Moreover, former studies have shown that monkeys suc-
ceed in tasks requiring them to discriminate between quantities
[11]–[24]. When required to trade tokens for rewards with two
different experimenters, tufted capuchins were able to select the one
providing the higher pay-off [32]. Here, subjects had to do more
than just choosing between two options, they had to draw different
decision rules from the contrasting conduct of two different human
partners. From previous work on discrimination learning, we know
that it is quite demanding for animals who learned in a training
phase to select one cue in a two-choice discrimination task to learn,
in a following reversal phase, that the second cue is then rewarded
[10], [49]. Our experimental situation was even more challenging
since it required subjects to respond in a different way at each
partner’s quality change. It is therefore not surprising that most
subjects failed to regularly alternate their decision rule in this
repeated conditional discrimination task.
In Phase 2, seven subjects – three macaques and four capuchin
monkeys – sized the opportunity to remove some raisins from the
initial amount in order to maximize pay-off. This corroborates
results previously found in a study where capuchins were observed
nibbling part of the initial item before returning it [8], [47].
Figure 2. Number of raisins returned by the subject Sha in Phases 1 and 3.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0017801.g002
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hindered success in this experiment. The fact that only a third of
the monkeys succeeded is not too surprising. Indeed, monkeys
were rewarded regardless of the number of raisins invested - even
no exchange whatsoever rewarded them with the 4 raisins they
kept. Therefore, there was no negative reinforcement for giving
one quantity or another. Although we aimed to test whether
monkeys could learn to differentiate between two experimenters’
qualities, we did not want to condition them to do so. In each
phase, it was up to them to realize the differences in the rewards
obtained according to the quality of the experimenter they were
interacting with. Previous studies have shown that monkeys could
recognize when experimenters subtracted several items from a
given number of incentives [50], [51]. In the present study, some
subjects consumed some of the raisins and gave the remaining to
the experimenter, whereas others first gave some raisins and then
ate the remaining ones. In both cases, subjects were able to remove
2–3 items from the total amount before giving 2-1 items to the
experimenter. We propose that subjects’ decisions rested on their
ability to recognize magnitudes, albeit in an imprecise way [52],
[53].
From the seven individuals who started giving back minimal
amounts in Phase 2, one behaved differently with each partner’s
quality of Phase 3; while he consistently gave one raisin to the fixed
partner, he eventually stopped exchanging with the doubling one.
Thus, this capuchin monkey was able to maximize pay-offs with
the fixed partner and could recognize that the doubling partner
might respond in a less satisfactory way. Still, he failed to
understand which rule would bring him optimal benefits with this
second partner.
It must be emphasized that one Tonkean macaque succeeded in
optimizing pay-offs with both experimenters. He followed different
decision rules with each experimenter’s quality in Phase 1, and did
it again with two new experimenters in Phase 3. By the end of each
phase, he invested a maximal amount with the doubling partner
and he removed most items before investing with the fixed one. To
our knowledge, this represents the only example of decision-
making by drawing different rules based on combination of
discrete quantities in monkeys, and maybe even in great apes. The
fact that only one of over 21 subjects could maximize benefits in
adapting investment according to experimenters’ quality indicates
that such a task is difficult for monkeys, albeit not impossible.
Cognitive limits can underpin the present results, but we cannot
exclude that different factors related to the design of the task
concurred to create additional difficulties. First, one may argue
that in Phase 3, monkeys only gave a minimal amount because
they had been trained to do so in Phase 2, and that training at this
stage would have also included training with the doubling partner.
It is likely that training with only the fixed partner influenced their
response greatly. However, training in Phase 2 was carried out to
counterbalance the very strong tendency of the subjects to
systematically give four raisins in Phase 1. If we had exposed
them to both contingencies again, this could have forbidden the
outcome ‘‘give as little as possible’’. Thus, in the actual set up
Phase 3 was run with the knowledge that the seven subjects
involved had all been capable of both responses, giving either a
maximum (Phase 1) or a minimum (Phase 2) number of raisins.
Second, albeit statistically significant, the weak difference of net
income between different experimenter’s qualities (1 raisin),
experienced by individuals in Phase 1 could be insufficient for
monkeys to detect that they were not maximising rewards. It is
known that monkeys can distinguish between weak differences of
items [15], [16]. Moreover, in Phase 3 this difference was two-fold
between experimenters. Nevertheless, subjects did not adjust their
return according to experimenters’ qualities. Finally, it is possible
that some individuals may require more exposure to each partner’s
quality in order to learn how to adjust their return. Whenever
individuals showed unstable strategies in each phase, additional
sessions were run to allow for such learning to occur. This however
did not lead to successful learning. Still, sufficient learning time is
probably a critical requirement for the adequate mastering of such
complex cognitive decision-making by most subjects. In humans,
being able to follow multiple directions or to switch between
decision rules develops slowly during childhood [54], [55].
Providing that sufficient learning time is allowed, and that
monkeys can pay attention to differences in partners’ quality,
maximizing pay-off using opposite decision rule is within the reach
of these species. In the present experiments we reduced the
complex interactions commonly addressed by behavioral biology
and economics to a simple dyadic situation in which subjects
interact with a human experimenter. This is a current procedure
in experimental cognition. Further research should attend more
specifically to those additional factors – whether ecological, social
or cognitive – liable to facilitate such learning in non-human
primates and other animals.
Trading with multiple partners following different rules is
characteristic of human economics; individuals make decisions
based on their expectations regarding partners’ responses. Here,
monkeys had to adjust the amount to be returned according to
their expectations about the behavior of two different experiment-
ers. Our results may have implications regarding how non-human
primates manage their relationships with conspecifics. The ability
to adapt pay-offs according to the gains potentially brought by
each partner could be related to the ability of individuals to invest
more in one mate or another [56]–[58]. Future studies should
compare monkeys and great apes to investigate whether the
development of such abilities would have preceded the rise of
economical transactions in humans.
Methods
Ethics Statement
Animals were given ad libitum access to food and water. All
procedures complied with the recommendations of the Weatherall
report. The research was conducted under license 67–100 from
the French Agricultural Department (Pre ´fecture du Bas-Rhin).
Subjects
The subjects were maintained at the Primatology Center of the
Strasbourg University. Their age and sex are presented on Table 2.
We tested eight tufted capuchins (Cebus apella) belonging to a group
of 18 individuals housed in an indoor-outdoor enclosure composed
of several compartments totaling 78 m
2. Four Tonkean macaques
(Macaca tonkeana) belonged to a group of seven individuals housed
in an indoor-outdoor enclosure composed of several compart-
ments totaling 35 m
2. Two other Tonkean macaques belonged to
a group of 16 individuals raised in a 1-acre wooded area including
a shelter and a 40-m
2 wire-mesh fenced enclosure used for
experiments. Three long-tailed macaques (Macaca fascicularis) were
housed together in an enclosure of 10 m
2 composed of several
compartments and located in an indoor room. Four other long-
tailed macaques were individually housed in the same room in
cages of 125680680 cm. Animals were fed with commercial
monkey diet. They were never deprived of food.
Testing Procedure
Subjects had been trained to exchange food items with
humans prior to experiments [8], [59]. Most subjects had been
Maximizing Pay-Off in Monkeys
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a piece of biscuit in their hand for a given amount of time before
returning it for a better or larger reward. All subjects succeeded
in waiting for more than 10 seconds in this task. The present
study, by comparison, was based on an immediate exchange and
imposed a lower need for self-control in all subjects. They were
also involved in daily training sessions over a 3-month period
where they had to give several Zante raisins to obtain twice the
number of raisins. Another experiment gave subjects some
background in discriminating between values of 6 and 18 food
items [60].
Group-living subjects were temporarily separated from their
mates into individual compartments and later released back into
their group. The experimenter sat in front of the wire mesh and
laid four cups containing four potential rewards on the ground in
full view of the subject. The number of potential rewards shown
depended on the quality of the experimenter running the trial. A
test started when the experimenter showed to the subject four
raisins on a teaspoon for 2 s. Then she gave them to the subject.
After 3 s, the experimenter held out a hand, palm open, in front of
the subject requesting them back. When the subject gave one or
more raisins, the experimenter rewarded the subject by supplying
him/her with a corresponding, larger, number of raisins from one
of the four potential cups (Figure 3). If the subject did not give
raisins, the trial ended. We waited for 2 min after the end of food
consumption before starting another trial.
Experimental Design
Two different experimenters familiar to the subjects were
involved in the testing phase. A first one, the doubling partner,
always returned a number of raisins twice those given by the
subjects. Therefore, potential rewards consisted in cups presenting
either two, four, six or eight raisins. The second experimenter, the
fixed partner, always returned eight raisins, regardless of the
number of raisins given by subjects (one to four). Thus, potential
reward consisted in one cup among four, each cup presenting eight
raisins. The subjects’ net income, i.e. the amount of raisins non-
invested by the subject plus those received, could vary depending
on which partner they interacted with (Table 1).
For training, a first 2 day-period was run where subjects were
trained to give several raisins. Subjects were submitted to one daily
Table 2. Subjects participating in the study.
Subjects Age (yrs) Sex Rearing conditions
Tufted capuchins
Kin 16 female group-living, indoor-outdoor
Ali 9 female group-living, indoor-outdoor
Pao 7 female group-living, indoor-outdoor
Arn 10 male group-living, indoor-outdoor
Pis 7 male group-living, indoor-outdoor
Pop 7 male group-living, indoor-outdoor
Rav 6 male group-living, indoor-outdoor
Sam 5 male group-living, indoor-outdoor
Tonkean macaques
Syb 5 female group-living, indoor-outdoor
Rim 6 male group-living, indoor-outdoor
She 5 male group-living, indoor-outdoor
Sim 5 male group-living, indoor-outdoor
Lad 11 female group-living, semifree-
ranging
Sha 5 male group-living, semifree-
ranging
Long-tailed macaques
Lou 11 male group-living, indoor
Ram 16 male group-living, indoor
Sad 12 male group-living, indoor
Cas 12 male separated, indoor
Don 16 male separated, indoor
Jac 15 male separated, indoor
Joe 11 male separated, indoor
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0017801.t002
Figure 3. Exchange sequence between capuchin monkey and
experimenter. (A) The experimenter presents four raisins on a spoon,
(B) The subject is allowed to take the raisins, (C) The subject is
requested to return the raisins, (D) The subject drops the raisins in the
hand of the experimenter, (E) The subject receives eight raisins in a cup.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0017801.g003
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described above initially provided the subject with either one or
four raisins and requested subjects to give them all to obtain eight
raisins. Three trials were run in a random order for each
condition. We did not require learning criteria for this step. In a
second 2-day training period, subjects were familiarized to the
doubling and fixed partners. They were exposed once (in a single
trial) to the doubling partner and once to the fixed. In order for
them to experience the difference in the reward amount, subjects
had to give at least one raisin to each partner. If they failed, a
second trial was run. Subjects needed between 2 and 4 trials to
reach this criterion.
With regard to the testing phase, we first tested subjects in
successive sets of two sessions (one session per partner) in a random
order. There was no more than one session of six trials per half-
day. The subjects’ net income could vary within one session from
24 to 48 raisins with the doubling partner, and from 24 to 66 with
the fixed partner. The partners’ role differed and was counterbal-
anced across subjects; the doubling partner for 11 subjects was the
fixed one for the remaining ten.
Because subjects failed to adapt their strategies according to the
quality of the partner they were tested with, we ran them in a
second phase involving the fixed partner only. We aimed to detect
whether subjects could maximize their gain in a simplified version
of the task. Phase 2 was run to counterbalance the tendency of
subjects to return all 4 raisins in Phase 1. Indeed, during the
training phase, all subjects had learned to return a maximum of
raisins, which was the main behavior observed in Phase 1. In
Phase 2 the goal was therefore to reinforce any subject who would
start ‘‘giving less’’. When subjects did choose the best strategy in
the second phase (giving only one raisin to obtain eight ones), we
tested them in a third phase, which replicated the procedure of
Phase 1. Phase 3 was then run with the knowledge that the seven
subjects involved had all been capable of both responses, giving
either a maximum (Phase 1) or a minimum number of raisins
(Phase 2). A single subject (Sha) directly passed from Phase 1 to
Phase 3 because of success in Phase 1. Each phase involved
different experimenters.
Whenever the strategy adopted by subjects was not stable at the
end of each phase, and to ascertain that no learning trend was
occurring, we added testing sessions until the performances’ curve
flattened. In Phase 1, subjects were tested in 21 sets of two sessions
with the doubling and fixed partners; the first set was a learning
period. One subject (Sha) was tested in 24 sets of two sessions.
Phase 2 was composed of 20 sessions with the single fixed partner.
Four subjects (Pao, Kin, Pis, Rav) were tested in 40 sessions. In
Phase 3, subjects were tested in 20 sets of two sessions with both
partners’ qualities. We conducted 25 sets with Rav and 24 sets
with Sha. Trials when subjects did not return any raisins (2.1% of
trials) were discarded from data processing.
To test whether subjects responded differently to the fixed and
doubling partners, we compared their performances at the
individual or at the group level in the last part of each testing
phase, i.e. the last 10 sets of sessions, using a Wilcoxon matched-
pairs test (exact procedure, [61]) with SPSS software version 16
(SPSS Inc., Chicago IL, U.S.A.).
Supporting Information
Figure S1 Number of raisins returned by 13 subjects in
Phases 1 and 2. In Phase 1, each set is composed of one session
with the doubling partner and another with the fixed one. In Phase
2, subjects were tested with the fixed partner only. They did not
modify their strategy in this phase. Each plot represents the mean
number of raisins returned in one session of six trials. Errors bars
represent standard errors of the mean for each session. The subject
Pao was tested for a larger number of sessions than others to
ascertain that no learning trend occurred in its performances.
(PDF)
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